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CHALLENGING IMPUNITY? THE FAILURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA TO PROSECUTE
PAUL KAGAME
INTRODUCTION

A

genocide begins. A rebel group, organized and efficient, sweeps
in to save a country from the atrocity but commits crimes themselves. The rebel leadership takes over and the commanders stay in control. All too familiar is the scenario in which those who purport to bring
justice to post-conflict countries enjoy impunity by remaining in power.
The doctrine of command responsibility in international criminal law1
states that criminal liability may be imposed upon a military commander
or civilian leader who has either participated in the commission of a
crime or failed to prevent or punish criminal subordinates.2 This theory
has been incorporated into the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”),3 established to prosecute those responsible
for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law during the 1994 massacres.4 Under Article 6.3 of the Statute, a supe1. International criminal law is generally described as a “body of law that assigns
individual criminal responsibility for breaches of public international law” and derives
from treaties, international customs, and general principles. RONALD C. SLYE & BETH
VAN SCHAACK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 3–4 (Vicki Been et al.
eds., 2009).
2. GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 5 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2009).
3. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, pmbl., Nov. 8, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1589 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for
genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring
States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
Id.
4. The Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 955 establishing
the Court after it found that violations of international humanitarian law constituted a
genocide and a threat “to international peace and security” within Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Id.; Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The
Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501, 502 (1996). The ICTR is
located in Arusha, Tanzania. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited May 18, 2012). The Tribunal consists of: the Chambers and the Appeals Chamber; the
Office of the Prosecutor, in charge of investigations and prosecutions; and the Registry,
responsible for providing overall judicial and administrative support. Id. There are cur-
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rior is not exempt from criminal responsibility for crimes committed by
their subordinates.5 Furthermore, criminal responsibility is not relieved
by the official position, such as head of state, of an accused under Article
6.2.6 Nevertheless, Paul Kagame,7 former leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF,” later the Rwandan Patriotic Army (“RPA”))8 and current President of the Republic of Rwanda, has not been prosecuted despite evidence that soldiers under his command committed crimes
against humanity.9
rently ten cases in progress, one awaiting trial, sixty-five completed cases (nineteen pending appeal and eight acquitted), and nine accuseds are still at large. Id.
5. ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 6.3.
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
Id.
6. ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 6.2 (“The official position of any accused person,
whether as head of state or government or as a responsible government official, shall not
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”).
7. The current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, led the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(“RPF”) in 1994 when they entered Rwanda and ended the genocide. See generally
COLIN M. WAUGH, PAUL KAGAME AND RWANDA: POWER, GENOCIDE AND THE RWANDAN
PATRIOTIC FRONT (2004).
8. The RPF (later the Rwandan Patriotic Army (“RPA”)) was a rebel group formed
of mostly exiled Tutsi in Uganda following a wave of emigration in the 1960s after a
tumultuous transition to Rwandan independence. The RPF’s goal was to repatriate and it
attempted an attack on the Hutu dominated Rwanda in 1990 in which most of the RPF
leadership was killed. See Cyrus Reed, Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 34 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 479 (1996).
9. Under Article 3 of the ICTR Statute on Crimes Against Humanity, the Tribunal
has power to:
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c)
Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts.
ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 3. To establish that crimes against humanity have occurred, the prosecution must prove “there was a widespread or systematic attack against
the civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.” Prosecutor v. Théonest Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Judgment, ¶ 2165 (Dec. 18,
2008). Evidence that the RPF committed crimes falling within this category are found in
the “smoking gun” known as the Gersony Report, presented to the UNCHR on October
11, 1994 and subsequently suppressed by the U.N. Summary of UNHCR Presentation
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This Note explores the failure of the ICTR to indict Kagame despite its
willingness to utilize command responsibility to prosecute criminals.10
Prosecuting Kagame is a step toward challenging impunity that the ICTR
must take before the end of its mandate.11 Failure to do so will impede
the growth of criminal responsibility in international law while simultaneously allowing commanders, who, able to retain power in post-conflict
governments, walk free despite having committed or failed to prevent the
commission of some atrocious crimes. The evidence to support indicting
Kagame is now stronger thanks to the accessibility of a previously suppressed report12 that documented the crimes of the RPF as well as a recently released United Nations (“UN”) report evincing crimes committed
by the RPF in surrounding territories.13 With the vested use of command
before Commission of Experts: Prospects for Early Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees
currently in Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire, RWANDINFO (Oct. 10, 1994),
http://rwandinfo.com/documents/Gersony_Report.pdf [hereinafter Gersony Report]. The
report cites “systematic murders and persecution of the Hutu population.” Carla De Ycaza, Victor’s Justice in War Crimes Tribunals: A Study of the International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda, 23 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 53, 57 (2010); see ALISON DES FORGES ET AL.,
LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 692–735 (Human Rights Watch,
2d ed. 1999).
10. Bakone Justice Moloto, Command Responsibility in International Criminal Tribunals, 3 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 12 (2009).
11. The ICTR is striving to complete its mission by 2013. Judge Dennis Byron, Pres.,
ICTR, Address to the United Nations Security Council: Six-monthly Report on the Completion
Strategy
of
the
ICTR
(Dec.
6,
2010),
available
at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/.ictr.un.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1180.
12. Gersony Report, supra note 9. The report was initially suppressed and its existence denied. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 728–31. A UN cable to then SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan addresses the controversy surrounding rumours of Gersony’s report
and stating that Gersony had concluded that the massacres “could only have been part of
a plan implemented as a policy from the highest echelons of the government” and that he
had “staked his 25 year reputation on his conclusions.” U.N. Assistance Mission for
Rwanda, Cable dated Oct. 14, 1994 from the Head of the Missions, Shaharyar Khan, to
the
U.N.
Secretary-General
(Oct.
14,
1994),
available
at
http://webpages.charter.net/jabdmb/Gersony1.PDF. Additionally it expressed that Kagame was “furious with the accusations” and that the report had been made public without authorization. Id.
13. The report was the result of a mapping exercise conducted by the UN after mass
graves were discovered in the Congo in 2005. Off. of the High Comm’r for Human
Rights [OHCHR], DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations 1993-2003 (2009) [hereinafter
DRC
Mapping
Report],
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/RDCProjetMapping.aspx. One
of the objectives was to map the human rights atrocities that occurred from March 1993
to June 2003. Id. The result was a 550-page report after over 1,500 documents were gathered relating to human rights violations and over 1,200 witnesses were interviewed. Id.
With regard to its implications for the case at hand, the ICTR’s temporal restrictions con-
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responsibility, this evidence has created the perfect opportunity not only
for the Tribunal to prosecute crimes against humanity that have been neglected but also to demonstrate how a comprehensive application of
command responsibility can be utilized effectively against a leader.14
Part I of this Note will provide a background of the 1994 Rwandan
genocide and the role of the RFP. Part II will explore the theory of command responsibility and its elements in international criminal law15 and
how command liability16 has been utilized and defined vis-à-vis ICTR
jurisprudence. 17 With the aforementioned evidence, Part III will show
how the doctrine of command responsibility can be an effective tool for
prosecuting leaders via an application to Kagame. Failing to pursue the
case would be an impediment to the growth of command responsibility
for future criminal prosecution, as well as a failure to act in accordance
with international criminal law and with the principles set forth in establishing the ICTR.18

fine the relevance of the report to those crimes occurring in the year 1994 but does provide jurisdiction over crimes committed in the neighboring States. ICTR Statute, supra
note 3, pmbl.
14. Sean Libby, [D]effective Control: Problems Arising from the Application of NonMilitary Command Responsibility by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 23
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 201, 205 (2009).
15. Additionally, the contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), established to prosecute those responsible for war crimes committed in the
Balkans in the 1990s and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), are mentioned. About
the ICTY, ICTY-TIPY, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Mar. 1,
CRIM.
CT.,
http://www.icc2012);
About
the
Court,
INT’L
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) [hereinafter INT’L CRIM.
CT.]. The ICC is the first permanent court of its kind. About the Court, supra. Established
under the Rome Statute of 1998, it was set up to prosecute the most serious violations of
international law of threat to the international community. Id.
16. Command responsibility and command liability are used interchangeably.
17. International criminal law has evolved “primarily though the decisions and judgments of courts of law,” and the development of command responsibility is one such
example of how principles in international humanitarian law develop through international institutions. METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 8–9.
18. Resolution 955 expressed the desire to put an
end to . . . crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons
who are responsible for them, [c]onvinced that . . . the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law . . . would
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and
maintenance of peace” after its determination that the situation in Rwanda constituted a “threat to international peace and security.
ICTR Statute, supra note 3, ¶¶ 5–7.
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I. GENOCIDE AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT
A.

Historical Context

Rwanda’s political history is tumultuous and the events leading up to
the genocide of 1994 are complex.19 Misconceptions and theories abound
as to the exact reasons why relations between Tutsi and Hutu, the two
main ethnic groups within Rwanda, resulted in genocide beyond comprehension. The result was not only the murder of 800,000 over the
course of one hundred days but subsequent killings of perpetrators and
victors alike.20
The Rwandan Patriotic Front grew out of a turbulent history of ethnic
tension and colonial persecution.21 Rwandans who fled the country in the
early to mid-1900s to escape ethnic violence22 grew tired of persecution
from hosting governments and started to organize.23 Two such Rwandans
and members of the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (“RANU”),24
Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, founded a guerrilla group called the
National Resistance Movement (“NRM”).25 Kagame became the head of
military intelligence of the National Resistance Army (“NRA”), the mili19. Given the complex nature of the history and events that led up to the 1994 genocide, this Note is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview but rather strives to
provide the reader with a generalized background before delving into the more pressing
issue of establishing the crimes of the RPF and the doctrine of command responsibility.
20. Crystal Faggart, U.N. Peacekeeping After Rwanda: Lessons Learned or Mistakes
Forgotten?, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 495, 496 (2008).
21. See DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 31–64.
22. From the 1920s to the 1960s, the Belgian colonialists began to implement Tutsi in
positions of power, aggravating already tense ethnic relations between Hutu and Tutsi
and setting the scene for the future conflict. Independence from Belgium, gained in 1960,
brought in a dominant Hutu party (the Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation Hutu or
Paramehutu) leaving the Tutsi monarchy to flee from the “Hutu Revolution.” The number
of those in exile in the countries surrounding Rwanda continued to grow and by the time
the RPF was formed in the 1980s there were approximately 500,000 in exile. Mark A.
Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda’s Domestic
Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 555–57 (1998); see also Chi
Mgbako, Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in PostGenocide Rwanda, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 201, 204 (2005); DES FORGES ET AL., supra
note 9, at 36–40.
23. Drumbl, supra note 22, at 557.
24. RANU was organized by those in exile in repose to the Rwandan monarchy and
stood for the creation of a socialist state in Rwanda. Due to its leftist and controversial
ideology, the leaders of the RANU movement took it underground. Reed, supra note 8, at
484.
25. The guerrilla group was founded in part against the Ugandan regime of Obote,
who accused Rwandans of supporting Amin’s rule in Uganda and attempted to increase
anti-Rwandan sentiment to garner more support for himself. Id. at 483.
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tary wing of the NRM.26 As the guerilla movement grew the name was
changed to the Rwandan Patriotic Front in an effort to consolidate the
mission of its members.27 The underlying aspiration was to eventually
secure a return to Rwanda.28
The RPF’s first opportunity to attack Rwandan President Habyarimana,
by whose hands many Tutsi had suffered discrimination, came in October 1990.29 The attack failed, and the resultant death of Rwigyema propelled Kagame into the leadership position of the RPF.30 In retaliation,
Habyarimana violently persecuted thousands of Tutsi still living in
Rwanda. 31 The RPF continued an active resistance 32 until the Arusha
Peace Accords in 1993 attempted to bring about a power-share between
the RPF and Habyarimana’s government. 33 Tenuous at best,
Habyarimana perceived the peace agreement as more of a threat than a
movement toward reconciliation and began to increase his military and
train the youth wing of his political MRND (“Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement”) party, forming the Interahamwe
(meaning “those who attack/work together”).34 The underlying tensions
broke when, on April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana was shot
down, killing the President and all on board.35 What ensued within hours

26. Id. at 485.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Drumbl, supra note 22, at 558.
30. Reed, supra note 8, at 489. At the time Kagame had been studying military command at Fort Leavenworth in the United States. See WAUGH, supra note 7, at 47–49. Having suffered defeat, Kagame went about “reorganizing, retraining and recruiting his army,
which he was rapidly to transform into a formidable fighting force.” Id. at 52.
31. Drumbl, supra note 22, at 558–59; DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 49;
WAUGH, supra note 7, at 53.
32. Habyarimana’s regime was assisted by troops sent by the French. DES FORGES ET
AL., supra note 9, at 118.
33. Mgbako, supra note 22, at 204.
34. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 4; KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA’S
GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 26 (2005). The RPF likewise did not believe
the Arusha Accords would prove successful and so continued to enlist and train soldiers.
DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 129.
35. Speculations abound as to Kagame’s and the RPF’s involvement in the crash of
Habyarimana’s plane. See Peter Robinson, Can Rwandan President Kagame be Held
Responsible at the ICTR for the Killing of President Habyarimana?, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
981, 982–83 (2008). It is not the intention of this Note to imply that this charge be added
to the allegations of crimes committed by the RPF under Kagame. Moreover, a French
court recently overturned a previous ruling, appearing to now exonerate Kagame from
involvement in the downing of the plane. John Irish, French Probe Exonerates Rwanda
(Jan.
10,
2012),
Leader
in
Genocide,
REUTERS
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and for the next one hundred days was the systematic slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu.36
B.

The Crimes of the RPF

Upon the death of President Habyarimana, the careful planning of
those opposed to the Arusha Peace Accords began to unfold in a horrifying genocide. 37 The army, newly trained Interahamwe, and ordinary
neighbors began to turn on the Tutsi and moderate Hutu while the rest of
the world and the UN peacekeeping forces 38 in Rwanda stood by and
watched. 39 Presented not only with the murder of thousands of fellow
Rwandans but a political opportunity, the RPF entered Rwanda and advanced towards Kigali.40 For fifteen weeks as the genocide unfolded at
an alarming rate, the RPF moved into the country, gaining control of Kigali in mid-July.41 The RPF quickly established a coalition government
and appointed their commander, Kagame, as the Minister of Defense and
Vice-President. 42 By gaining control of Kigali and soon thereafter the
remainder of Rwanda, the RPF ended the genocide.43 Thousands, fearing
retaliatory killings with the RPF in power, fled into the surrounding
countries.44

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/11/rwanda-genocide-reportidINDEE80A00J20120111
36. See DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 180–221.
37. Reed, supra note 8, at 496.
38. The UN initially deployed about 1,300 peacekeepers after the Arusha Accords.
UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was to monitor observance
of the ceasefire and was under the command of Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, who fought
unsuccessfully for additional UN troops to be sent Rwanda as the genocide began and the
international community deserted the country. MOGHALU, supra note 34, at 18; see
ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN
RWANDA 289 (2003).
39. Reed, supra note 8, at 496–97.
40. Id. at 497.
41. Drumbl, supra note 22, at 563; WAUGH, supra note 7, at 67–74.
42. Reed, supra note 8, at 497; WAUGH, supra note 7, at 76.
43. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 13.
44. Most fled to Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo). The Security Council approved Operation Turquoise to deploy French Troops into Rwanda as the RPF advanced. It was estimated that as the RPF continued its attacks the number of internally
replaced persons in the designated “safe zone” in Rwanda grew from 500,000 to over one
million in a matter of days. Once victory was declared it was estimated that over 2.5 million refugees had fled the country, mostly into Zaire. Jason A. Dzubow, The International
Response to the Civil War in Rwanda, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 513, 516 (1994). The UN
Mapping Report on the Congo puts the number of refugees that entered the Congo at 1.2
million following the genocide. DRC Mapping Report, supra note 13, ¶ 131, at 50.
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Evidence that crimes were committed by the RPF during their sweep
into Rwanda and the subsequent weeks as they took control was first exposed in a report submitted by Robert Gersony45 to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) on October 10, 1994.46
Gersony headed a mission that was conducted over five weeks from August to September of 1994 and consisted of over two hundred interviews
in nine UNHCR refugee camps and at ninety-one locations within the
country.47 The report cited evidence of “systematic and sustained killing
and persecution of . . . civilian Hutu populations by the [RPF].”48 The
killings were described as “indiscriminate killings against men, women,
children, including the sick and the elderly” occurring at meetings held
under the pretext of peace49 as well as during the pursuit of hidden populations and asylum seekers.50 There was an “unmistakable pattern of systematic [RPF] conduct”51 that resulted in “more than 5,000 but perhaps
as many as 10,000 [deaths] per month.”52 Furthermore, the report cites
evidence that in the Gisenyi prefecture53 there was a “systematic pattern
of arbitrary arrests and the disappearances of adult males [and] . . . the
execution of at least dozens of those arrested was credibly reported.”54
The mission was short and only three prefectures were visited – but the
evidence it accumulated strongly supports a case for crimes against hu-

45. Robert Gersony was sent by the UN Human Rights Commission to conduct an
investigation into repatriation of refugees but he became increasingly convinced of RPF
crimes and began to gather data that was then submitted in a report. DES FORGES ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 726. This report was then suppressed and its existence denied until recently being leaked in September 2010. Id.; see Gersony Report, supra note 9.
46. According to DES FORGES ET AL., the report submitted by Gersony concluded “the
RPF had engaged in widespread and systematic slaughter of unarmed civilians. In September 1994, the UN, in agreement with the U.S. . . .agreed to suppress the report but
demanded that the RPF halt the killings.” DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 14.
47. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 1.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Des Forges states that RPF solders were responsible for massacring unarmed
civilians, many of them women and children, including those who assembled for a meeting at the request of the RPF. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 692–735. The people
were told to come receive food or to be given instructions. Id.
50. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 4–5.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Of the eleven prefectures in Rwanda, Giseney is located in the far west of Rwanda bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then Zaire) above Lake Kivu. Map
CRIM.
TRIBUNAL
FOR
RWANDA,
of
Rwanda,
INT’L
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/MapofRwanda/tabid/125/Default.aspx (last visited
Mar. 1, 2012).
54. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 11.
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manity.55 Reporting that RPF soldiers “killed dozens of political and military leaders . . . family members, including women, and children in a
number of these cases” in the early raids against Kigali, 56 the report
likewise included in its list of violence mass killings at meetings, doorto-door killings, killing of asylum seekers, and killing of those who had
begun to return.57 Amnesty International reported that “many of the killings took place in a series of arbitrary reprisals mainly against groups of
Hutu civilians.”58 Other documents likewise acknowledged the reprisal
killings, going so far as to posit that crimes against humanity were taking
place.59 The conclusion of the Gersony Report is unequivocal: “an unmistakable pattern of systematic RPA conduct of such actions is the unavoidable conclusion of the team’s interviews.”60
II.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY: ELEMENTS AND APPLICATION

In order to effectively utilize command responsibility as a way of imposing liability upon Kagame for crimes committed by the RPF, it is
necessary to understand the history and how individual elements of the
doctrine have been interpreted and employed. Underlying the doctrine is
an understanding that the laws of war sanction what would otherwise be
murder and that subordinates, acting under the command of a superior,
are freed from liability in the commission of such acts.61 The command55. Ycaza, supra note 9, at 58–59 states “[t]he numbers and hard evidence prove
conclusively and decidedly favor prosecution of the RPF for these widespread and systematic killings. However, the discrepancies in opinions about the magnitude of the
crimes have made it difficult to move forward with prosecution of RPF members for the
crimes they committed.” (citing Okechuckwu Oko, The Challenges of International
Criminal Prosecutions in Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 343, 384–85 (2008)).
56. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 14.
57. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 4–6.
58. Amnesty Int’l, Rwanda: Reports of Killings and Abductions by the Rwandese
Patriotic Army, AI Index AFR 47/016/94 (Oct. 14, 1994), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR47/016/1994. The DRC Mapping report cites
that the forces crossed the border to chase Hutu refugees. DRC Mapping Report, supra
note 13, ¶ 193.
59. See Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the situation
of human rights in Rwanda, ¶¶ 22, 54, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/7 (June 28, 1994) (by R. Degni-Ségui) stating not only that the RPF had
been guilty of “summary executions” but that “the assassinations and other inhuman acts
committed against the civilian population, like the acts of persecution for political motives combined with the war crimes, constitute crimes against humanity.”
60. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 6.
61. Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility, 5 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 638, 661–62 (2007).
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er’s responsibility to lead—and, when crimes beyond those sanctioned
by the laws of war are committed, prosecute—is intertwined with the
subordinates’ privileged position. 62 Thus, the responsibility to control
subordinates and liability for failure to punish for crimes committed by
them is justifiably placed upon the commander.63
The emergence of modern-day command responsibility is customarily
dated back to the U.S. Military Commission decision in the trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita in 1945,64 which, while not the first to address
the responsibility of commanders, remains a controversial decision in its
utilization of the theory.65 Despite the contentious nature of the decision,
it set precedent by recognizing that commanders had an affirmative duty
to make sure that subordinates abided by the law and that failure to ensure such obedience could result in the commander being convicted.66
From this controversial “beginning” through the Nuremburg Tribunals,
set up to prosecute the senior German commanders post-WWII,67 and the
Tokyo Tribunals, prosecuting the crimes of Japanese leaders during the

62. Id. at 662.
63. Id.; HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND
MILITARY LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 89–90 (Michael Bohlander
et al. eds., 2009).
64. Yamashita’s conviction appeared to be based on a mere unawareness that his
troops in the Philippines were committing crimes and the military commission that was
trying him famously said,
It is absurd, however, to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because
one of his soldiers commits a murder or a rape. Nevertheless, where murder
and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences, and there is
no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts,
such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless actions of his troops, depending upon their nature and the circumstances
surrounding them.
4 U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 35 (1948). The
U.S. Supreme Court is considered to have then adopted this form of liability by denying
Yamashita remedy after a habeas petition was brought. See Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S.
1 (1946).
65. The idea of commanders being held criminally responsible for the actions of his
soldiers dates back to the times of Sun Tzu. James D. Levine II, The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Application to Superior Civilian Leadership: Does the International Criminal Court have the Correct Standard, 193 MIL. L. REV. 52, 54–58 (2007);
METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 5–8; Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for
War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1973); Beatrice I. Bonafé, Finding a Proper Role for
Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 599, 601 (2007).
66. Levine, supra note 65, at 59.
67. Id. at 60.
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war,68 the growth of the doctrine stagnated until the creation of the ad
hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)69 and the ICTR, by the UN.70 This lull in development is
largely attributed to the failure of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,71
which, while codifying a majority of the international humanitarian laws,
failed to comment on the doctrine, a misstep that delayed the doctrine’s
wider acceptance.72 This error was later amended in Additional Protocol
I of 1977 to the Geneva Convention, allowing the doctrine to be codified
in part in the international law regime.73
Established to bring post-conflict justice in their respective regions, the
ad hoc Tribunals actively added to the development of command liability
in their early years.74 Due to this initial enthusiasm, the Tribunals can
now lay claim to the modern day interpretation and understanding of
command responsibility.75 Both statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR address and create criminal liability for commanders who failed to either
prevent or punish perpetrators under their command.76 In Article 7.3 and
Article 6.3, the respective statutes of the ICTY and ICTR lay out command responsibility in identical phrasing that a criminal act:
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the

68. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (“Tokyo Tribunal”) was established mostly to address the mistreatment and security of prisoners of war. Matthew
Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility, 8
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 17–18 (2001).
69. The ICTY was established to prosecute those responsible for war crimes committed in the Balkans in the 1990s. It began in 1993 to deal with crimes against humanity,
genocide, and war crimes. About the ICTY, supra note 15.
70. Daniel Watt, Stepping Forward or Stumbling Back? Command Responsibility for
Failure to Act, Civilian Superiors and the International Criminal Court, 17 DALHOUSIE J.
LEGAL STUD. 141, 158 (2008).
71. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 set forth the core rules that form international
humanitarian law, regulating conduct in war and specifically protecting those outside
armed conflict. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
72. Levine, supra note 65, at 65.
73. Id. at 65, 68; Additional Protocol I laid forth that “The fact that a breach of the
Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his
superiors from penal disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had
information.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 86.2,
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
74. See METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 12.
75. Bonafé, supra note 65, at 601.
76. Levine, supra note 65, at 72.
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subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.77

In short, any “person exercising effective control over a number of
subordinates is criminally liable under international law if he fails to prevent or punish their crimes as long as the superior knew or had reason to
know about such crimes.” 78 The Tribunals have recognized three elements necessary to establish liability:
i)

the existence of a de jure or de facto superior—
subordinate relationship of effective control;

ii)

the superior knew or had reason to know that the
criminal act was about to be or had been committed;

iii)

the superior failed to take the necessary steps to prevent or punish the offences.79

While straightforward in theory, numerous issues arise in the practical
application of each doctrinal element.80 Consistent application was further complicated at the ICTR due to an early decision that “the Chamber
finds it appropriate to assess [the doctrine] on a case by case basis.”81
Understanding how each element has come to be interpreted and applied
at the ICTR and more generally in international criminal law will inform
the manner in which the doctrine can be effectively used to prosecute
Kagame.
A. Establishing the Superior-Subordinate Relationship
The key element fundamental to any attempt to establish liability under
command responsibility is the link between the perpetrator and the superior. Without the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship the the-

77. ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 6.3; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7.3, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
78. Ilias Bantekas, On Stretching the Boundaries of Responsible Command, 7 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 1197, 1197 (2009).
79. Bonafé, supra note 65, at 605; Martinez, supra note 61, at 642; Moloto, supra
note 10, at 15–16.
80. Jamie A. Williamson, Command Responsibility in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 CRIM. L.F. 365, 366 (2003).
81. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 491 (Sept. 2, 1998).
This approach made sense given the undeveloped state of the doctrine and the approach
was reaffirmed in the case of Prosecutor v. Musema Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment,
¶ 135 (Jan. 27, 2000).
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ory of command responsibility cannot be used.82 Within the classical military structure, the relationship is clearly drawn. Complications arise
when charges are brought against citizens, political leaders, and, more
recently, the possible extension to guerrilla and terrorist leaders.83 Where
military commanders oversaw or ordered the execution of illegal actions,
accountability is easily justified due to their position of authority and
clear delineation of control over their subordinates.84 Indirect command
responsibility proves more ambiguous85 and it appears accepted that the
designation of command does not have to be strictly formal in the military sense, but is rather broken into individual elements of de jure86 and
de facto87 control.88 Where the authority of nonmilitary leaders mimics a
military-like structure, actions are easily placed within the scope of
command responsibility; growth of the doctrine has now incorporated
political and civilian leaders as well.89
What is crucial to the application of command responsibility to the
nonmilitary context—where the militaristic structure is not clearly mimicked—is the degree of authority that these citizens are found to have
exercised over those who commissioned the crime.90 The Tribunals now
apply the “effective control” test to see whether superiors had the “material ability to prevent and punish”91 crimes committed.92 If this standard
is not found, a superior will not incur liability under the theory of command responsibility.93 Because of the degree of difficulty in identifying
the duties of civilian leaders, command responsibility is less frequently
applied where other preferable forms of liability, such as joint criminal
enterprise, are available and easier to establish.94
82. How the relationship has come to be defined has grown but still at the core is
necessity of some kind of relationship. Moloto, supra note 10, at 15–16.
83. Williamson, supra note 80, at 368; Levine, supra note 65, at 80–82; see also Watt,
supra note 70; Moloto, supra note 10, at 15–16.
84. Bonafé, supra note 65, at 603–04.
85. Martinez, supra note 61, at 639–40.
86. De jure meaning: “[e]xisting by right or according to law.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 194 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).
87. De facto is defined as: “[a]ctual, existing in fact; having effect even though not
formally or legally recognized.” Id. at 187–88.
88. Levine, supra note 65, at 74; METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 138–39.
89. Moloto, supra note 10, at 16–17; Bonafé, supra note 65, at 604; METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 102.
90. METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 102.
91. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
92. Moloto, supra note 10, at 17.
93. Id.
94. METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 107; OLÁSOLO, supra note 63, at 262.
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The trial of The Prosecutor v. Kayishema illustrates how the ICTR has
developed the de facto and de jure elements of the superior-subordinate
relationship.95 As the acting prefect96 of Kibuye prefecture97 during the
1994 genocide, Kayishema was considered the “highest local representative of the government,” but effectively remained a citizen.98 On trial for
genocide stemming from massacres that occurred in local churches, a
stadium, and the surrounding areas, the Tribunal sought to establish Kayishema’s liability for initiating attacks and failing to subsequently prevent or punish the crimes of others.99 In order to establish the superiorsubordinate relationship the ICTR found that, while the conflict at the
time created a lawless state, within the prefecture, Kayishema had de jure
control over the soldiers and officials responsible for the deaths and
crimes committed during the genocide.100 Indeed, as a result of his respective position, the Tribunal stated “[t]he Trial Chamber finds that it is
beyond question that the prefect exercised de jure authority over these
assailants.”101 The Chamber thus established a direct link by virtue of this
position of the Accused over the bourgmestre102 (mayor) and the gendarmerie within the prefecture.103
Finding evidence of the Accused’s de jure control, the ICTR proceeded
to follow the steps of the ICTY’s Prosecutor v. Delalic (“Celebici”) and
assess the existence of de facto control.104 The Celebici case concerned
95. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 7 (May 21, 1999).
96. A mayoral-type position.
97. Kibuye is the most mid-western of Rwanda’s eleven prefectures. See Map of
Rwanda, supra note 53.
98. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, ¶ 7. Clement Kayishema became the Prefect
of Kibuye commune on July 3, 1992. Counts 1–6 in the indictment lay out the grounds
for Kayishema’s responsibility in genocide when Tutsis, seeking refuge in the Catholic
Church in Kibuye were surrounded and massacred, resulting in the deaths of thousands.
He was furthermore charged with initiating an attack against refugees hiding in the
Kibuye stadium. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25–37.
99. Id. ¶¶ 25–44.
100. Id. ¶ 479.
101. Id. ¶ 480.
102. Within the eleven Prefectures of Rwanda there are communes, led by the bourgmestre (effectively a mayor). The bourgmestres are appointed by the President and are in
charge of the governmental functions within their respective communes. Alongside the
Prefect (who is the highest local representative of the government in the Prefecture) the
bourgmestres hold authority over the members of the army and Gendarmerie Nationale
in their commune. The Gendarmerie Nationale is the armed forces lead by the Minister
of Defense. Id. ¶¶ 7–11.
103. Id. ¶¶ 41–54.
104. Alexander Zahar, Command Responsibility of Civilian Superiors for Genocide, 14
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 591, 603–04 (2001). In the Celebici case, a commander, his deputy,
and a senior officer were charged with “willfully causing great suffering and serious inju-
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three prison guards being prosecuted for crimes committed within a prison camp while they stood watch.105 The ICTY had posited a strict standard in which liability would be extended in cases where control mimicked that held by military commanders.106 However, in the case of Kayishema at the ICTR, the Chamber used a less stringent analysis and
found that de facto liability could be imposed upon civilians as:
no legal or formal position of authority need exist between the accused
and the perpetrators of the crimes. Rather, the influence that an individual exercises over the perpetrators of the crime may provide sufficient
grounds for the imposition of command responsibility if it can be
shown that such influence was used to order the commission of the
crime.107

However, in continuing its breakdown of de facto control, the ICTR
then went on to posit that:
[t]he mere existence of de jure power does not always necessitate the
imposition of command responsibility. The culpability that this doctrine gives rise to must ultimately be predicated upon the power that the
superior exercises over his subordinates in a given situation.108

Thus the Chamber seems to suggest that while de jure alone cannot
impute responsibility, de facto control could.109 The Tribunal found Kayishema held control through a determination that, while his de facto aury . . . for their alleged acts and omissions as superiors.” Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic,
Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT 96-21-T, Judgment, ch. II, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)).
105. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT 96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 1
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
106.
Accordingly, it is the Trial Chamber’s view that, in order for the principle of
superior responsibility to be applicable, it is necessary that the superior have
effective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of international humanitarian law, in the sense of having the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these offences. With the caveat that such authority can have a de facto as well as a de jure character, the Trial Chamber accordingly shares the view expressed by the International Law Commission that
the doctrine of superior responsibility extends to civilian superiors only to the
extent that they exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is
similar to that of military commanders.
Id. ¶ 378 (emphasis added).
107. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, ¶ 492 (emphasis added).
108. Id. ¶ 491.
109. Id.; Jamie A. Williamson, Command Responsibility in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 CRIM. L.F. 365, 369 (2003).
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thority was less than his de jure control as the prefect during the genocide, both branches of control still existed.110
The question regarding the relationship between the superior and subordinate relies upon the degree of influence or control that the superior
exercises. 111 The “effective control” test 112 appears in the case of The
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, who was accused of genocide for acts committed in Mukingo commune of which he was the bourgmestre.113 Kajelijeli
was convicted of direct and public incitement of genocide due to his
presence at various mob sites and his participation in transporting members of the Interahamwe.114 The Tribunal declared that there was enough
evidence to establish that the Accused, who was likewise involved in the
training and ordering of the Interahamwe, “held and maintained effective
control” and was therefore liable under the theory of command responsibility.115
Authority in the case of Kajelijeli, who was a bourgmestre and had exercised his control over the military, was clearly delineated in comparison to the case of Prosecutor v. Musema.116 Addressing one of the biggest contentions in command responsibility, the extension of the doctrine
to civilians, the ICTR found that Musema, as the manager of a tea factory, exercised both de jure and de facto control over the tea workers by
virtue of his control over the finances and his ability to hire and fire the

110. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, ¶ 25–44; Libby, supra note 14, at 218–19.
111. Williamson, supra note 80, at 370.
112. See supra pp. 697–98.
113. “The Appellant was bourgmestre of Mukingo Commune . . . As bourgmestre, he
exercised important responsibilities at the commune level: he represented executive power, had authority over civil servants, and could request intervention by commune police
forces.” Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, Judgment, ¶ 2 (May 23,
2005); Libby, supra note 14, at 221.
114. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, ¶¶ 3–4. The Interahamwe were the youth
group of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement, “MRND”). Beginning in 1992 the MRND
began to provide them with military training and they were used extensively during the
1994 massacres. See DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 4; see also supra pp. 689–91.
115. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, ¶ 609. The Accused was the bourgmestre of
Mukingo Commune from 1988 to 1993 and then reappointed in June of 1994. As the
bourgmestre he was found to have control over the locals and was thus accused of ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting genocide and crimes against humanity. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
116. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 141 (Jan. 27, 2000).
Alfred Musema was appointed the director of Gisovu Tea Factory in 1984. While the
head office of the factory was in Kibuye, the Accused was responsible for both the
Kibuye and Gokongoro prefectures. Id. ¶¶ 12–16. He was charged and then convicted for
genocide.
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workers at the factory.117 As his employees, their involvement in crimes
relating to the genocide implicated Musema and made him liable under
command responsibility for the commission of genocide.118 The Chamber held that liability may be imposed, “be it de jure or merely de facto”
control.119 This application of command responsibility has been criticized
as lacking the necessary similarity to military authority in relying merely
on the legal and financial power of a manager and is illustrative of the
vacillating application of the doctrine.120
The case of Prosecutor v. Bagilishema exhibited a return to the military-structure requirement advocated by the ICTY’s Celebici case and
initially referred to at the ICTR in Kayishema. 121 The Chamber stated
that the doctrine would extend “to civilian superiors only to the extent
that they exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is
similar to that of military commanders.” 122 The case set forth a twopronged test, incorporating both “effective” control and the “material
ability” to prevent and punish, to determine whether or not a civilian
could be considered a superior.123 Ultimately, the analysis of the Trial
Chamber held that any de facto authority had to be accompanied by some
evidence of de jure authority.124 Chain of command, issuing orders, and

117. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, ¶ 881.
118. Id. ¶ 893.
119. Id. at 7.
120. “[T]he ICTR conflated the ability to punish people for failing in their duties as
employees with the power to punish someone for violent acts. It is unclear that Musema’s
power to fire or reprimand his employees could reasonably be equated to the power to
deter genocidal acts.” Libby, supra note 14, at 223; Williamson, supra note 80, at 372.
121. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 42 (June 7,
2001); Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., Case No. ICTY 96-21-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T,
Judgment, ¶ 493 (May 21, 1999).
122. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, ¶ 42 (citing Delalic, et al., Case No. ICTY
96-21-T); Williamson, supra note 80, at 372.
123. Williamson, supra note 80, at 372.
124. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, ¶ 43.
According to the Trial Chamber in Celebici, for a civilian superior’s degree of
control to be ‘similar to’ that of a military commander, the control over subordinates must be ‘effective,’ and the superior must have the “‘material ability’ to
prevent and punish any offences. Furthermore, the exercise of de facto authority must be accompanied by ‘the trappings of the exercise of de jure authority.’ The present Chamber concurs. The Chamber is of the view that
these trappings of authority include, for example, awareness of a chain of
command, the practice of issuing and obeying orders, and the expectation that
insubordination may lead to disciplinary action. It is by these trappings that the
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being accustomed to a following would all be used to evidence authoritativeness that went beyond mere local popularity and followings.125 Without any de jure authority similar to that found in the military, a civilian
would not be found liable. 126 This more restrictive view was partially
relaxed by the Appeals Chamber, which held that control is more than
the mere existence of de jure authority.127
The ICTR’s decision to tackle liability under command responsibility
on a case-by-case basis has resulted in numerous interpretation discrepancies of the elements. The extension of the doctrine beyond the military
context further complicated its application, though for the most part the
Tribunal has successfully employed its two-step test to determine the
superior-subordinate relationship. 128 What remains at the core for the
principal element of command responsibility is a consideration dependent not upon military status but upon “the degree and nature of authority
and control wielded by the individual.”129
B. The Requirement of Knowledge
At what point should a commander have had reason to know his subordinates committed a crime in order to meet the requisite second element of command responsibility—knowledge?130 The ICTY has recognized that when arguing that a superior “had reason to know,” evidence
must be given showing that there was specific information available to
whomever was in charge.131 At the ICTR, the element has been incon-

law distinguishes civilian superiors from mere rabble-rousers or other persons
of influence.
Id. ¶ 43.
125. Id.
126. Williamson, supra note 80, at 372.
127. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-A, ¶¶ 55, 62 (July 3, 2002).
The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber had failed to appropriately consider de
facto analysis and that control could not be limited to de jure. Id. ¶ 61; Williamson, supra
note 80, at 373.
128. Libby, supra note 14, at 228; Williamson, supra note 81, at 372–73; Bonafé, supra note 65, at 609.
129. Williamson, supra note 80, at 367 (citing Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana,
Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 216 (May 21, 1999)).
130. Levine, supra note 65, at 82.
131. JOHN E. ACKERMAN & EUGENE O’SULLIVAN, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 87 (2000) (“[A] superior can be held criminally responsible only if some specific information was in fact
available to him which would provide notice of offences committed by his subordi-
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sistently applied despite initially appearing in the Tribunal as a straightforward standard.132 Generally, the mens rea element133 does not result in
strict liability.134 Circumstantial evidence of the crimes is an acceptable
method to establish the requisite knowledge at the ICTR, including but
not limited to: the number and type of acts, the troops involved, and the
location of those accused at the time of commission.135
Where a commander failed to obtain available information on an alleged crime, the question becomes whether this failure in and of itself
should result in liability.136 Knowledge will not be presumed and thus
any prosecution must provide evidence that the commander had access to
evidence of his subordinates’ plans or acts and failed to take any action.137 Accordingly, the element of knowledge in command responsibility falls somewhere between strict liability and negligence all the while
creating liability for omission as well.138 It appears that despite the initial
proposition of a strict standard, the actual application at the ICTR displays more flexibility.139
The standard of “knew or had reason to know” under Article 6.3 of the
ICTR was equated in Prosecutor v. Akayesu to “acquiescence or even
malicious intent.”140 This initial high standard of knowledge has not been
nates.”) (citing Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT 96-21-T, Judgment, Ch. II, ¶ 393 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
132. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 489 (Sept. 2, 1998);
Libby, supra note 14, at 215–16.
133. A concept taken from domestic criminal law meaning the mental state of a criminal.
134. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 44
(Dec. 13, 2002).
135. Libby, supra note 14, at 213; Moloto, supra note 10, at 17–18.
136. Moloto, supra note 10, at 17–18; Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command
Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 472 (2001) (“[N]egligent disregard of information suffices for responsibility, major criminals can still be brought to justice: although
their knowing participation in the wrongdoing cannot be proven, they can still be held on
negligence grounds.”).
137. Levine, supra note 65, at 74.
138. Id. at 83. This remains true for the ICTY and the ICTR but here the ICC seems to
show some development to the doctrine. The ICC statute differs from the Tribunal by
broadening the knowledge requirement to “should have known” for military commanders,
which would effectively make the evidentiary chain of liability easier to build. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
139. Williamson, supra note 80, at 379.
140. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 489 (Sept. 2, 1998).
Jean-Paul Akayesu was the bourgmestre of the Taba commune and was charged with
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violating Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Id. ¶ 1.2; Libby, supra note 14, at 216.
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consistently applied in practice.141 In most instances the mens rea element must be established142 and underlying this is a debate as to whether
the knowledge standard places a positive duty upon superiors to inform
themselves of potential crimes or if it is sufficient that based on the context of the relationship and crimes, knowledge can be imputed.143 The
case of Prosecutor v. Bagilishema offers a detailed analysis of the requisite mens rea.144 The Chamber set forth that a superior
possesses or will be imputed the mens rea required to incur criminal liability where: he or she had actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that his or her subordinates were about
to commit, were committing, or had committed a crime under the Statutes; or, he or she had information which put him or her on notice of
the risk of such offenses by indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such offenses were about to be committed.145

The decision goes on to add that where the lack of knowledge is “the
result of negligence in the discharge of the superior’s duties” criminal
liability will be imposed as the superior should have known, echoing the
“notice of the risk” seen above.146 This decision appears to significantly
expand the “malicious intent” comparison that had come in Akayesu147
and it is important to note that only one year prior, in Musema, the
Chamber noted that the idea of “should have known” appeared too
broad.148
141. Libby, supra note 14, at 216.
142. Occasionally an undertaking is not even necessary to establish knowledge, as in
Akayesu, where the defendant admitted to knowing that killings were taking place.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, ¶ 182.
143. Williamson, supra note 80, at 365 (citing Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No.
ICTR 95-IA-T, Judgment, ¶ 46 (June 7, 2001)).
144. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, ¶ 46; Williamson, supra note 80, at 377.
Ignace Bagilishema was the Bourgmestre of Mabanza commune in Rwanda. The decision
in Bagilishema is unfortunately an example of the difficulty in the application of the doctrine as despite allegations of his involvement and presence at the site of killings he was
acquitted on the basis that the prosecutor lacked enough evidence to establish command
responsibility. Libby, supra note 14, at 224.
145. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, ¶ 46 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. See supra p. 702–03.
148. The discussion was in the context of the adoption of Article 86.2 of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which holds commanders liable. Prosecutor v.
Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 146 (Jan. 27, 2000); Williamson, supra
note 80, at 376–77. Alfred Musema, the director of a tea factory in Kibuye prefecture,
was held accountable for the actions of his tea factory workers and accused of genocide
and crimes against humanity. The Chamber found him guilty under command responsi-
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The “should have known” standard relies upon the position of the superior for consideration of the knowledge requirement. 149 Therefore
where the superior had the means to obtain knowledge and failed, the
fact that the superior was negligent in his duty could potentially impose
liability by virtue of his position. This is far closer to an imposition of an
affirmative duty upon the superior than before.150 However, despite the
proposition of a broader mens rea standard, it appears that the ICTR
tends to more closely follow the standard set forth by the ICTY where
the superior will incur liability only if he or she were put on notice or if
there was a deliberate refusal on the part of the superior to obtain more
information.151
C. The Failure to Prevent or Prosecute
The third element of the doctrine imposes upon commanders a responsibility to pursue and prosecute offenders once a crime has been committed and the offenses are known.152 This last element is made up of two
distinct parts, either of which could arguably create liability; the first is
the duty to prevent a crime if the superior is suspicious or aware that
such crime could occur, and the second is the requirement to punish
those who have committed a crime.153 The first measure entails a duty to
investigate reported crimes and establish their veracity.154 If crimes are
established, liability will be imposed, but only insofar as the commander
bility and herein lies the discrepancy between Musema and Bagilishema as the Court
found that as Musema was “personally present at the attack sites, [the Chamber] is of the
opinion that he knew or, at least, had reason to know that his subordinates were about to
commit such acts or had done so.” Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, ¶ 894.
149. Libby, supra note 14, at 207.
150. Williamson, supra note 80, at 377.
151. Id. at 379 (citing Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶
226 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). Criminal liability
exists on the part of a commander if the latter is seriously negligent in his duty
to obtain the relevant information. The point here should not be that knowledge
may be presumed if a person fails in his duty to obtain the relevant information
of a crime, but that it may be presumed if he had the means to obtain the
knowledge but deliberately refrained from doing so.
Id.; see also, METTRAUX, supra note 2.
152. OLÁSOLO, supra note 63, at 97–99; Levine, supra note 65, at 75; Williamson,
supra note 80, at 380.
153. Moloto, supra note 10, at 19; OLÁSOLO, supra note 63, at 97–99. METTRAUX
states that the duty to prevent or punish are “two distinct obligations and two alternative
bases for liability, so that the violation of either of these duties to prevent and to punish
crimes could engage the criminal liability of a superior.” METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 230.
154. Moloto, supra note 10, at 20.
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had the material ability to prosecute.155 The threshold test of materiality
is whether or not the superior attempted to take “necessary and reasonable measures,” a test dependent upon procurement of evidence.156 Despite theoretically having a standard from which to start, case law at the
ICTR has not yet defined what “necessary and reasonable” entails.157 A
mixture of the superior’s control and whether that control would have
allowed the superior to prevent or punish the perpetration of the crime
are elemental considerations.158
One application of this third element at the ICTR is found in the case
of Kayishema, where the Chamber held that:
where the perpetrators of the massacres were found to be under the de
jure or de facto control of Kayishema, and where the perpetrators
committed the crimes pursuant to Kayishema’s orders, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that it is self-evident that the accused knew or had
reason to know that the attacks were imminent and that he failed to
take reasonable measures to prevent them. In such a case, the Trial
Chamber need not examine further whether the accused failed to punish
the perpetrators.159

The ICTR dismissed any investigation into the Accused’s actions to
mitigate violence based on allegations of his involvement in the perpetration of the crimes, thus setting a less-than-critical standard for the examination of a defendant’s actions in stopping or prosecuting crimes.160 Similarly, in the Musema case, the Tribunal found that as the manager of the
tea factory—not only knowing about but also having participated in the
attacks himself—the Accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable
steps to prevent or subsequently punish the crimes.161 By the ICTR’s reasoning, since the Accused had the ability to fire or hire employees, he
also could have prevented or punished those committing the crime of
genocide. 162 This rationale has drawn the criticism that it equates the
155. OLÁSOLO, supra note 63, at 97–99.
156. Moloto, supra note 10, at 20.
157. Williamson, supra note 80, at 381; Moloto, supra note 10, at 19–20. “Necessary”
is generally viewed in the context what laws were applicable to the accused at the time
“for instance, a superior is required by domestic law to report allegations of crimes or
where he is expected to request the professional assistance of a particular body.” Under
international law “reasonable” generally refers to measures that are “legal; feasible; proportionate; and timely.” METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 238–41.
158. Williamson, supra note 80, at 381.
159. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 505 (May 21,
1999) (emphasis added).
160. Id.; Libby, supra note 14, at 220.
161. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 894 (Jan. 27, 2000).
162. Id. ¶ 895;Watt, supra note 70, at 165–66.
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ability to fire someone with the ability to deter genocide.163 Nevertheless,
the Chamber’s reasoning in holding Musema liable under command responsibility was ultimately strengthened by evidence showing not only
that the Accused had participated, but that he also acted as a leader during the attacks.164
Despite similar evidence to Musema, in the later Bagilishema case the
Tribunal found that it was still insufficient to establish that presence at
the scene of attacks was enough to incur liability.165 This finding could
conceivably complicate the earlier analysis. However, it appears from the
Judgment that the Tribunal took into consideration evidence that the Accused attempted to take some protective measures but lacked the resources to deter attacks.166 The “Accused attempted to prevent Hutu from
attacking Tutsi . . . the Chamber notes that . . . the Accused felt that he
had insufficient resources.” 167 The Chamber then weighed the lack of
sufficient evidence of the Accused at the attacks against his attempted
preventative actions, leaning in favor of no liability under the doctrine.168
Alternatively, the Chamber may have found that issuing fake identity
cards, falsifying resident registers and other acts on the part of the Accused may have been sufficient to satisfy the “reasonable and necessary”
standard for preventing the commission of crimes.169
Another aspect to consider for the failure to prevent or punish was also
set forth in Bagilishema, where the Chamber found that where a superior
“creates an environment of impunity,” criminal responsibility may be
incurred. 170 Following from Prosecutor v. Blaskic at the ICTY, 171 the
ICTR held that command responsibility for failure to punish “may be
triggered by a broadly based pattern of conduct by a superior, which in
effect encourages the commission of atrocities by his or her subordinates.” 172 Responsibility “may arise from . . . failure to create or sus163. Libby, supra note 14, at 223; Zahar, supra note 103, at 602–03.
164. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, ¶ 902.
165. Libby, supra note 14, at 225.
166. The accused submitted letters that described his attempts to procure soldiers from
the Prefect to restore security and an additional letter to the Prefect on January 7, 1993 in
which he had attempted to prevent Hutu from attacking but had insufficient resources.
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 125, 128 (June 7,
2001).
167. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, ¶ 128.
168. Williamson, supra note 80, at 382.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 383.
171. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. ICTY 95-14-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
172. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, ¶ 50.
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tain . . . an environment of discipline and respect for the law.”173 By allowing subordinates the leeway to disrespect the law, the superior fails in
the prevention of crimes and thereby can incur liability under command
responsibility.174 This goes to the heart of Article 6.3, which the Chamber
stated is “not that the crimes of subordinates should be punished but that
superiors should ensure that the crimes do not occur.”175 Any analysis
with regard to this extension would still be susceptible to evidence showing that it may have been outside the superior’s material control to take
the necessary steps to control the subordinates, thus avoiding liability.
Nevertheless, it still demands that the superior create an environment in
which subordinates are aware that crimes committed will not go unpunished while similarly creating an incentive for superiors to maintain control and keep themselves informed of any potential violations.176 The last
element of command responsibility thus requires of the superior a positive duty to act, either in preventing a perpetrator or pursuing and punishing those who have committed the crime.177
Despite the difficulties presented by each element of command responsibility, the ICTR has helped create and undoubtedly strengthened a doctrine whereby a superior, whether in a position of power in the military,
political, or social context, can be held criminally responsible for crimes
committed by subordinates. Applying this doctrine on a case-by-case
basis has resulted in a doctrine that, while at times inconsistent, has established a foundation that can provide guidance for future prosecutions.
Consequently, those found in a superior-subordinate relationship, who
have knowledge or are in a position that requires their awareness of actions by subordinates, and who fail to take reasonable and necessary
steps to prevent or punish, will incur liability at the hands of the Tribunal.
So why did the ICTR fail to prosecute Paul Kagame?
III.
APPLICATION OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY TO THE CASE OF
KAGAME
In order to establish that Kagame was responsible for the crimes committed by the RPF as their commander, the three requisite elements of
command responsibility must be established. One must first prove the
existence of his de jure or de facto relationship over members of the
RPF; second, that he knew or had reason to know that the crimes were
173.
174.
¶ 50).
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Williamson, supra note 80, at 383 (citing Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T,
Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, ¶ 50 n.55 (emphasis added).
Williamson, supra note 80, at 383; Zahar, supra note 103, at 604.
Williamson, supra note 80, at 380.
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committed; and lastly that he failed to take the necessary steps to prevent
or punish the offenses.178 The ICTR’s case law has developed each of
these elements sufficiently that when applying them together, the doctrine can be successfully applied in the case of Kagame.
It would not be a hard stretch to find that Kagame, the highest-ranking
military commander in the RPF, had de jure and de facto control over the
members of the RPF. The standard set forth in the Kayishema case held
that a civilian prefect had influence by virtue of his position over soldiers
and officials in his prefecture.179 Likewise, the Kajelijeli case held that
where the Accused had trained and commanded the Interahamwe, there
was sufficient evidence establishing his effective control over the subordinates.180 The purported return to the military structure requirement of
responsibility in Bagilishema set forth the analysis wherein “effective
control” and “material ability” to prevent and punish must be established
in order for liability to be incurred.181 Therefore, to satisfy the requisite
key element of a superior-subordinate relationship for liability under
command responsibility, it must be established that the RPF was a military-like structure and that Kagame, as the leader, held effective control
with the material ability to prevent and or punish the crimes allegedly
committed by the RPF.
Kagame was the military leader of the RPF during the 1994 operation
in Rwanda.182 The RPF, while a guerrilla group, closely mimicked a military structure as evidenced by their command structure and militaristic
organization, military success in taking over Rwanda, and subsequent
transition to power in the post-genocide days.183 The RPF was “acknowledged by military experts to be a highly disciplined force, with clear
lines of command and adequate communication.”184 They had extensive
communication “up and down the hierarchy” implying that the “commander of [the] army must have known of and at least tolerated these
practices.” 185 Kagame, militarily-trained after his post as the head of
178. See supra pp. 690–91.
179. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 480 (May 21,
1999).
180. Libby, supra note 14, at 221.
181. See supra pp. 696–98.
182. MOGHALU, supra note 34, at 13.
183. Reed, supra note 8, at 498. The attack of the RPF into Rwanda in April of 1994
was a well-established offensive. It involved “three main thrusts across an 80-kilometer
front, breaking out from position in the northern demilitarized zone.” WAUGH, supra note
7, at 67–68. One branch came down the east, with units joining later, while a western
flank took over Byumba and Ruhengeri dividing the FAR in the west and northwest. Id.
184. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 14.
185. Id. at 734–35.
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military intelligence in Uganda, had organized the RPF into an efficient
force, as demonstrated by their quick attacks and organization while entering Rwanda in 1994.186 With the well-documented evidence of Kagame as leader of the RPF and his command over the forces, there is certainly enough evidence to establish that a superior-subordinate relationship existed between Kagame and the RPF troops to satisfy the first element of command liability.
The second consideration of command responsibility is the requirement of knowledge—that Kagame had knowledge that members of the
RPF were committing crimes against humanity. During the genocide and
in the months following, imputing knowledge of the crimes committed
by RPF troops upon Kagame poses a challenge given the general disarray of the country.187 Nevertheless, to address this element of knowledge,
the requisite “knew or had reason to know” standard under Article 6.3
can be established, as seen in the case of Bagilishema, through either
direct or circumstantial evidence.188 In addition to the determination that
Kagame was the leader of the RPF, the ICTR has shown itself willing to
entertain circumstantial evidence that will infer knowledge.189 A superior
will incur liability in situations where he or she was put on notice190 or
where there was a deliberate refusal to obtain more information and the
ICTR has purported to impose an affirmative duty upon those who would
obtain information by virtue of their position alone.191
It may be hard to concretely ascribe that Kagame had personal
knowledge that the crimes were occurring. However, evidence exists that
high-ranking officials within the RPF were aware.192 Seth Sendashonga,
former RPF Minister of the Interior, has been quoted as saying that there
was “an attempt at ‘social engineering on a vast, murderous scale’”193
and estimated that tens of thousands of people were killed by the RPF.194
Reports that “the crimes committed by RPF soldiers were so systematic
and widespread and took place over so long a period of time” allow the
inference that “commanding officers must have been aware of them.”195
186. WAUGH, supra note 7, at 40, 46; DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 692.
187. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 692.
188. See supra p. 701–02.
189. Williamson, supra note 80, at 377 (quoting Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No.
ICTR 95-IA-T, Judgment, ¶ 46 (June 7, 2001)).
190. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-IA-T, ¶ 46.
191. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 479 (Sept. 2, 1998);
Williamson, supra note 80, at 377.
192. Ycaza, supra note 9, at 60.
193. Id.
194. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 16.
195. Id.
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Indeed, “the RPF itself . . . acknowledged these killings by Rwandan Patriotic Army (‘RPA’) soldiers, although it described them as ‘isolated incidents.’”196 The data collected by Human Rights Watch in the aftermath
of the genocide led it to conclude that “RPF abuses occurred so often and
in such similar ways that they must have been directed by officers at a
high level of responsibility. It is likely that these patterns of abuses were
known to and tolerated by the highest levels of command of the RPF
forces.”197 It was also reported that Kagame had at the very least been
informed about killings in the Byumba prefecture but did not intervene.198 It is thus unlikely that Kagame, in light of his position, had no
knowledge that any of these crimes were occurring.199 With the requisite
standards in mind, it appears that there is enough evidence to sufficiently
impart knowledge to Kagame, and while perhaps the ICTR would require further investigation to disallow any questionability, by virtue of
the standard set forth in the Bagilishema case, what has been demonstrated may suffice.
Having established the requisite superior-subordinate relationship and
the mens rea of command responsibility, the duty to prevent or punish is
the last element necessary for imposing liability. This duty poses an interesting question. It is easy to see that during the calamity and chaos of
the genocide, Kagame may not have been in a position to prevent the
reprisal killings by his soldiers. But even if the duty to prevent goes unmet, the duty to punish remains. Therefore, though encompassing two
elements, failure in one element may still result in liability.200 The ICTR
has taken a “necessary and reasonable” standard to begin any such determination of liability and while no clear definition has been established,
considerations of the superior’s control and the extent of that control are
brought into play both for prevention and for the material ability to punish.201 Additionally, as in Bagilishema, liability may follow where there
is evidence that an “environment of impunity” was created.202 Therefore,
even though the RPF commanders may not have specifically given the
orders, the evidence suggests that in most cases they did not halt the kill-

196. MOGHALU, supra note 34, at 27.
197. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 692.
198. Id. at 735.
199. WAUGH, supra note 7, at 151 stated that Kagame acknowledged his forces committed atrocities though he emphasized that there was a “low number” of victims.
200. See supra pp. 701–02.
201. Williamson, supra note 80, at 381.
202. Id. at 383.
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ings or punish those responsible, thus creating a sense that the reprisal
killings were acceptable.203
The RPF was able to take Kigali and Kagame acquired an official position of power very quickly.204 As the Vice President and Minister of Defense, Kagame hardly lacked the authority to prosecute, even less so as
President of the Republic. Numerous promises to punish have been issued by the Rwandan government, but little if any progress has been
made.205 Despite several arrests and convictions of corporals and soldiers
in connection with the RPF crimes,206 the small number of prosecutions
suggests that a culture of impunity for the RPF victors was and has been
established. For a time, this was attributable to the “non-existence of a
genuine administrative structure” as one UN report stated.207 Nevertheless, it is now sixteen years later and there is little to show. With that reality at hand, the third and last element of failing to prevent or punish in
establishing command responsibility is satisfied.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of command responsibility is a critical prosecutorial tool
in international criminal law. The combination of the doctrine of command responsibility and the evidence of RPF crimes committed under the
leadership of Paul Kagame creates an opportunity to establish a clear and
comprehensive precedent for this doctrine. Where before evidence was
lacking and the doctrine was less cohesive, there is now a chance to pursue justice. There is likewise a sense of urgency as the ICTR nears the
end of its mandate and the window of opportunity begins to close. Prosecuting Kagame is important not only as a step to challenging impunity as
the ICTR purports to do, but also to show how command responsibility
can be an effective tool against future leaders who retain power. The
necessary elements of the doctrine provide enough safeguards that those
who may lack some elements of power and control will not get caught up
in overzealous prosecution. Simultaneously, the doctrine ensures that
those in command who commit or oversee the commission of crimes will
not gain impunity by maintaining the position that gave them such capabilities in the first place.

203. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 714.
204. Reed, supra note 8, at 497.
205. Ycaza, supra note 9, at 70.
206. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 732–33.
207. Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Rwanda, ¶ 6, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/12
(Aug. 12, 1994) (by R. Degni-Ségui).
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Despite enough evidence and a doctrine by which liability can be imposed, there is an unfortunate reality that must be addressed in any attempt to prosecute Kagame. He is, after all, the current President of
Rwanda and responsible for having led an army that ended a horrendous
genocide. 208 The stability of the African Great Lakes region postgenocide is often attributed to Kagame’s quick establishment of a government and order.209 Prosecuting a head of state poses its own challenges and undeniably bringing a case against Kagame has the additional
hurdle of international guilt when it comes to Rwanda. 210 Though the
ICTR has prosecutorial discretion, thus far RPF members have not been
brought before the Tribunal.211 Criticism that the ICTR is merely pursuing victor’s justice seems warranted when considering that, despite evidence of crimes, members of the RPF are not being held accountable.212
This would mean prosecuting some of the highest leaders in the current
government, a situation clearly unfavorable to the Rwandan government
and the international community.213 Arguments about regional stability,
while persuasive, should not allow those who commit crimes to walk free,
because “feeding the culture of impunity cannot foster peace and reconciliation.”214 This is especially true when it comes to those in positions of
power. Deference to a commander who was able to put an end to an atrocious genocide is commendable but not where it undermines the integrity
of the international criminal justice system.
Foregoing justice for those who fell victim to the actions of the RPF
under Kagame’s command is too high a price and, despite his past commendable acts, Kagame should be tried before the ICTR under command
responsibility for crimes against humanity. Only then will justice be
served. Likewise, in creating a stronger doctrine, future commanders
who maintain positions of power in post-conflict situations will be put on
notice. These future leaders will be subject to higher levels of scrutiny
and increased likelihood of accountability for crimes committed under
208. Robinson, supra note 35, at 982.
209. Ycaza, supra note 9, at 72. See generally Drumbl, supra note 22, at 564; WAUGH,
supra note 7, at 85.
210. MOGHALU, supra note 182, at 18. The international community was more interested in extracting their own citizens than coming to the rescue of a small country somewhere in Africa. There are numerous books and articles written on the failure of the United Nations to assist despite being warned and having the capabilities. See, e.g., DALLAIRE,
supra note 38, at 476–79; DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 595; SAMANTHA POWER,
“A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 329–89 (2002).
211. See Ycaza, supra note 9.
212. Id. at 80.
213. Id. at 71.
214. Id. at 81.
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their watch. With the perfect storm of evidence and doctrinal analysis,
the ICTR has an opportunity to forcefully impact command responsibility in international criminal law that will endure beyond its mandate.
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